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1. INTRODUCTION
The trade policy of the United States government
reflects an attempt to reconcile the inherently incompatible
goals of free trade and protectionism. One central objective
is the promotion of free trade based on "the unchallenged
proposition that every country is better off in a world of free
trade than in a world in which all countries practice highly
protectionist policies .... "' Thus, a global economy
promoting free trade enhances competition within indus-
tries which, in turn, yields greater efficiency and better
products, particularly in domestic companies.
At odds with free trade, however, is protectionism, which
"protects one group - some special interest - at the
expense of the general public."3  Outwardly, the U.S.
government has adopted a posture extolling the virtues of
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' Anne 0. Krueger, Free Trade Is the Best Policy, in AN AMERICAN
TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR THE 1990S 68, 68 (Robert Z. Lawrence
& Charles L. Schultze eds., 1990) [hereinafter AN AMERICAN TRADE
STRATEGY].
2 See id.
s Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the
United States with Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26
GEO. WASH. J. INVL L. & ECON. 539, 539 (1993).
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free trade. U.S. political leaders' apparent acknowledge-
ment of the benefits of free trade, juxtaposed with the
consistent failure of protectionist trade policies, has lead to
a contradictory outcome - these leaders have not complete-
ly embraced free trade and continue to advocate protection-
ism.4 For example, the United States regularly invokes
antidumping measures. These protectionist policies are
incompatible with a system of free trade, and, more
specifically, they are incompatible with the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade5 ("General Agreement" or
"GATT") to which the United States is a signatory. Can the
Uruguay Round Agreements of the GATT overcome linger-
ing conflicts between U.S. protectionism and the goals of
free trade? This Comment reviews this question specifically
in the context of antidumping laws.
Section 2 of this Comment reviews the General Agree-
ment, its history, goals, and treatment of antidumping laws.
Section 3 documents the history of antidumping laws in the
United States and analyzes their effect on both the national
economy and on the United States' position in international
trade. Section 4 addresses the Uruguay Round itself, some
of the changes in international antidumping practices
resulting from this round of agreements, as well as possible
ramifications for the United States. Section 5 details
Congress' response to the Uruguay Round.6 Section 6
compares specific provisions of the implementing legislation
with provisions of the General Agreement and analyzes the
vulnerabilities of the resulting U.S. policies to foreign
challenge. Finally, Section 7 predicts the world commun-
ity's reaction to the changes in U.S. antidumping laws.
4 See id.
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in
IV Basic Instrument and Selected Documents 3 (1969) [hereinafter
General Agreement].
6 It was clear from the outset that if the United States ratified the
General Agreement, U.S. antidumping laws would require substantial
alterations in order to align with the GATT. As there could be no
tampering with the GATT itself, members of Congress focused their
energies on the implementing legislation.
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2. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
Established in 1948, the GATT emerged from Atlantic
Charter discussions between the United States and Brit-
ain.7 Ultimately, twenty-three trading nations jointly
entered into the first and "only multilateral instrument"
which sets out "agreed rules for international trade."
8
After the drafters abandoned related plans to charter an
International Trade Organization ("ITO"),9 the General
Agreement then took on a dual role ° both as an agree-
ment and as an organization." Since then, the GATT, has
not been a stagnant expression of international agree-
ment.
-12
7 See ROBERT JEROME, WORLD TRADE AT THE CROSSROADS: THE
URUGUAY ROUND, GATT, AND BEYOND 4 (1992).
8 GATT INFORMATION AND MEDIA RELATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: WHAT IT Is, WHAT IT DOES 1
(1989) [hereinafter GATT INFORMATION LEAFLET].
' See id. The ITO was designed to be the "organizational base" of
the GATT and would have handled administrative functions related to
the General Agreement. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT § 1.7 (1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE].
10 See GATT INFORMATION LEAFLET, supra note 8, at 1-2.
" See id. at 1.
See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 324 (2d ed. 1986). A total of
eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have taken place under
the GATT. These are:
Participating
Location Year(s) Countries
1. Geneva, Switz. 1947 23
2. Annecy, France 1948 33
3. Torquay, England 1950 34
4. Geneva, Switz. 1956 22
5. "Dillon Round" - 1960-61 45
Geneva, Switz.
6. "Kennedy Round" - 1964-67 48
Geneva, Switz.
7. "Tokyo Round" - 1973-79 99
Geneva, Switz.
8. "Uruguay Round" - 1986-94 124
Punta del Este, Uruguay
See id. at 324-25; Communication from the Chairman, Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, 11 April 1994, reprinted in
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING
THE URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS
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Subsequent rounds of negotiation have reworked the
GATT."3 The Uruguay Round, the eighth round of these
multilateral trade negotiations, began in September
1986.4 These negotiations were undertaken in order to
further trade liberalization15 and were finally concluded in
December 1993, after more than seven years of negotia-
tions. 6 The Uruguay Round was signed in Marrakesh,
Morocco, by more than 100 countries (including the United
States) in April 1994."
2.1. Goals of the GATT
The General Agreement aims both to substantially
reduce "tariffs and other barriers to trade" and to eliminate
"discriminatory treatment in international commerce."
8
Although the language of the GATT is complex, agreement
among the signatories is predicated upon simple princi-
ples.'9 These principles include: (1) "trade without dis-
crimination," as stated in the "most-favored-nation"
clause;2° (2) "protection through tariffs;"2' (3) creating "a
stable basis for trade;"22 (4) "promoting fair competi-
IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND
REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1453, 2039 (1994) [hereinafter MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT].
13 See GATT INFORMATION LEAFLET, supra note 8, at 2-3. Parties
to the General Agreement have conducted a series of multilateral
negotiations to continue the reduction of trade barriers. Id.
'4 See JEROME, supra note 7, at v.
15 See GAT1T INFORMATION LEAFLET, supra note 8, at 3.
"6 House, Senate Conferees Complete Work on GAT Bill, Predict
Passage Next Month, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11, 431, 432 (Sept. 26,
1994).
17 See id.
18 General Agreement, supra note 5, preamble; see also JACKSON &
DAVEY, supra note 12, at 8 (noting that "[tihe principal goal of [the]
GATT was to establish agreed upon limitations on tariffs and to control
the use of certain non-tariff barriers to trade"); Roger P. Alford, Note,
Why a Private Right of Action Against Dumping Would Violate GATT,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 696, 696 (1991) ("To achieve these objectives, [the]
GATT is directed at 'the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce."').
19 See GATT INFORMATION LEAFLET, supra note 8, at 3.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 4.
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tion;"2 s (5) "quantitative restrictions on imports;"24 (6)
"the 'waiver' and possible emergency action;" (7) "regional
trading arrangements;" 26 and (8) "settling trade dis-
putes."2 ' Due to the GATT's relative success in effectuat-
ing these goals, it is recognized as the "most important
agreement regulating trade among nations."
28
2.2. Antidumping and the GATT
"Dumping"29 does not violate the objectives of the
GATT.3 ° The General Agreement defines dumping as
introducing a product "into the commerce of another
country at less than its normal value.""1 In other words,
23 Id.
24 Id.
2 Id. at 5.
26 Id. at 6.
27 Id.
' Alford, supra note 18, at 696 (quoting Roger P. Alford, When is
China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidump-
ing and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and
Other 2Vonmarket Economy' Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 83 n.23
(1987) (quoting JOHN H. JACKSON, The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, in 1 A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusINEss
TRANSACTIONS 41 (Walter S. Surrey & Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 2d ed.
1977))).
29 'Dumping' is a broad term used generally to describe the
discriminatory pricing of products sold in multiple international
markets." Theodore W. Kassinger, Antidumping Duty Investigations,
in LAW AND PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES REGULATION OF INTERNATION-
AL TRADE 1, 1 (Charles R. Johnston, Jr. ed., 1989). Another commen-
tator has pragmatically described dumping as "whatever you can get
the government to act against under the antidumping law." J. Michael
Finger, Preface to ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT
viii, viii (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993) [hereinafter Finger, Preface]. This
seemingly flippant definition insightfully describes the true nature of
the response to dumping in the United States. Duties against dumping
are often politically and patriotically motivated.
"0 Although the GATT allows antidumping laws to remain in force
in signatory nations, laws which prohibit or punish entities that "dump"
are antithetical to the goals of the General Agreement. See General
Agreement, supra note 5, art. VI. For example, antidumping laws,
which as a practical matter act to discriminate against foreign
producers that are able to sell their goods cheaply, violate the goal of
trade without discrimination.
"' Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, signed on April 15, 1994, part I,
art. 2, reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 12, at
1453 [hereinafter Agreement on Implementation]. "[I]f the export price
1995]
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a product is dumped when it is sold for less than the stan-
dard price in an exporting country. Consumers welcome
these dumping practices because the price of dumped goods
is lower.2 "Underlying the GATT approach to antidump-
ing duties is the fact that dumping itself is not against
GATT obligations." 3 Participants in the GATT negotia-
tions have not restricted dumping,34 each fearing, perhaps,
that such a restriction would harm domestic exporters or
each possibly believing the occasional bargains for consum-
ers to be a worthwhile benefit.35
Despite the nonprohibition of dumping underlying the
GATT, there nonetheless is an antidumping provision in the
General Agreement. 6 Antidumping duties are justified by
the rationale that although dumping itself may not be
violative of the GATT, there should be defense mechanisms
available to countries that find their domestic industries
harmed, not by competition based on superior efficiency, but
by attempts to "injure or destroy competition."37  The
GATT creates a balanced framework which provides
governments with the ability to defend domestic producers
against unfair trade practices." The balance is delicate,
however, because if the defensive measure goes too far, it
may itself become a protectionist mechanism.39
Article VI of the GATT is the "Antidumping Agreement."
At least one commentator has called it "something of an
anomaly: in essence it is an 'exception' to [the] GATT,
of the product exported from one country to another is less than the
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product
when destined for consumption in the exporting country," then the
product is said to be dumped. Id.
2 See McGee, supra note 3, at 544.
33 JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 9 § 16 1.
" See id. "The GATT approach was to leave these dumping and
subsidy measures generally legal, but to arm importing nations with an
exception to GATT obligations to enable them to defend against these
practices by antidumping and countervailing duties." Id.
35 For an example, see Jackson's discussion of the 1955 New
Zealand Proposal to add a clause reading: "Contracting Parties shall
refrain from any action that might cause or encourage dumping of this
kind." Id. at 402 n.4. This proposal was rejected. See id.
" See General Agreement, supra note 5, art. VI.
3' Alford, supra note 18, at 697.
38 See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 9, § 16.1.
" See id.
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allowing certain measures that would otherwise be a
violation of [the] GATT."4° The Article is designed so that
in order to impose antidumping duties, contracting parties
must abide by the guidelines established by the Antidump-
ing Agreement 4 when deciding whether dumping has
occurred,42 when determining injury,' and when levying
a duty." Under the GATT, members can level disparate
pricing of foreign and domestic products by using "duties to
offset dumping by foreign producers if it can be shown that
such behavior is causing actual or threatened material
injury to domestic producers."45 As stated above, the
GATT is concerned with the sale of goods at less than
"normal value."46 Normal value generally is understood as
the price of the product in the foreign producer's home
market.47 Underlying this notion of normal value is the
concept of price discrimination, whereby dumping occurs
when foreign entities price goods for export differently than
domestically sold goods.4"
The United States and the European Community
recently have expanded their abilities to assess duties by
interpreting dumping as pricing exports below cost.49
Furthermore, "cost has been interpreted as customary or
full cost rather than marginal cost."5" In contrast with
normal value, cost is a supply side concept which considers
all money expended to place the product on the market.
Thus, under a cost analysis, products sold in the United
40 Id. at 411 (footnote omitted).
41 In order to take advantage of the exception, any contracting party
to the GATT must follow stringent restrictions imposed by Article VI.
42 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 12, 145-48.
43 See id. at 148-51.
44 See id. at 157-59.
4' Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Managed Trade: Making the Best of
Second Best, in AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 142,
172.
46 See Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, at 1453.
41 See Tyson, supra note 45, at 172. This concept has also been
described as fair value. See Kassinger, supra note 29, at 33. "The
measure of dumping is then the amount by which the foreign market
value exceeds the U.S. price for the merchandise." Id. (citing 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673 (1988)).
48 See Tyson, supra note 45, at 172.
49 See id.
50 Id.
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States should be priced higher than in the domestic market
to account for added expenses. The United States and the
European Community both interpret selling products
between "cost" and the price in the producer's home market
as dumping based on pricing below cost.5' Moreover,
selling at prices below cost is often considered dumping,
even if such sales also occur in an enterprise's domestic
market.
52
3. HISTORY OF ANTIDUMPING LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES
"The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect ...
duties53 ... [and] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
54
3.1. Legislation
Congress first acted to restrict dumping with the
Antidumping Act of 1916 (the "1916 Act").55 The 1916 Act,
analogous in design to an antitrust law, targeted predatory
behavior.56 Certain aspects of the 1916 Act, however,
including strict standards of proof for private actions in
federal courts,57 have essentially rendered it useless. As
of 1991, only one serious action, subsequently dismissed,
was brought under the 1916 Act.5" Congress, in response
to the deficiencies of the 1916 Act,59 enacted the Antidump-
51 See discussion infra § 6.3.
52 See Tyson, supra note 45, at 172.
53 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
54 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (1976).
56 See Kassinger, supra note 29, at 5.
57 See id. at 5-6.
58 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1100, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1981); J. Michael Finger, The Origins and
Evolution ofAntidumping Regulation, in ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS
AND WHO GETS HURT, supra note 29, at 13, 18-19 (noting that the
Zenith case was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to establish a
plausible theory of predatory dumping).
"9 See RICHARD DALE, ANIDUMiPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE
ORDER 12 (1980) (discussing problems inherent in the 1916 Act).
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ing Act of 1921 (the "1921 Act). 6 -The 1921 Act "served
as the legal basis for adniinistrative antidumping actions
until it was substantially amended and incorporated into
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 as a result of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979. "" This 1930 Act as subsequently
amended is currently the fundamental authority for
administrative antidumping proceedings.62
3.2. Practical Effect
Despite attempts such as the 1916 Act, antidumping
laws in the United States have been largely ineffective in
preventing dumping.6" Apart from the seminal Zenith
Radio Corp. case, decided in 1974, private suits governed by
U.S. antidumping laws are nonexistent."' The Commerce
Department ("DOC") continues to levy duties, however, in
ro 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. I,
106(a), 93 Stat. 193 (1979).
61 Kassinger, supra note 29, at 6 (footnote omitted).
6 See id.; see also Peter 0. Suchman & Susan Mathews, Mixed
News for Importers, CHINA BUs. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 31, 31. The
authors note that:
The United States has a two-pronged procedure for determining
whether antildumping or countervailing duties should be
imposed. First, after a domestic producer, trade union, or
association files a dumping petition against a foreign product,
the [International Trade Commission] conducts an investigation
to determine whether such imports are injuring the U.S.
domestic industry. Then, [the Commerce Department], through
its International Trade Administration, investigates the foreign
producers named in the petition and determines whether the
goods are being dumped . . . in the U.S. market. If [the
Commerce Department] finds the goods are being unfairly
traded, it will also determine the extent, or margin, of dumping
or subsidy. Both agencies issue preliminary as well as final
determinations on each petition.
I See Alford, supra note 18, at 712-13 ("Few would argue that
present laws in the United States successfully meet the needs of
domestic industries competing with foreign competitors who are
unfairly dumping."). Professor Alford further argues that antidumping
laws are ineffective because duties are assessed only after violations are
detected, essentially eliminating the risks for would-be dumpers. Id. at
698.
" See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Finger, Preface, supra note 29, at 19.
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an attempt to penalize those who dump.65 This practice
has been the target of much criticism, particularly by econo-
mists who claim that it is inefficient and robs consumers of
lower prices.66 Some commentators argue that if interna-
tional commerce is reasonably competitive, antidumping
laws should not be used to deprive U.S. buyers of lower
prices.
Influence from lobbyists and U.S. industries, however,
seems to ensure the continued use of antidumping duties.
Despite studies demonstrating that antidumping laws have
a "net detrimental effect on the U.S. economy," lawmakers
continue to use these measures to support "domestic
friends."6" The DOC, to aid its decisionmaking, even uses
data provided in U.S. industry lobbying materials." Not
surprisingly, the Commerce Department has rejected only
four percent of all dumping cases decided since 1980.0
The steel industry has been one of the most active
groups in lobbying for strong antidumping laws. The DOC
has rewarded these efforts by granting the steel industry "a
minimum price umbrella through trigger pricing arrange-
ments in the late 1970s and early 1980s."71 From 1984
through 1985, the United States acted to protect the
domestic steel industry at great expense to U.S. steel
consumers.72 The United States threatened antidumping
duties against twenty-nine steel producing countries as a
means to force these countries to refrain from exporting
See Suchman & Mathews, supra note 62, at 31.
6 See Tyson, supra note 45, at 173.
' See Robert Z. Lawrence & Charles L. Schultze, Evaluating the
Options, in AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1, 39.
' Erick Schonfeld, Why Protectionism Will Outlive GATT, FORTUNE,
Nov. 28, 1994, at 16, 16.
See id. The DOC uses the most adverse possible information,
usually provided by U.S. industries, as the "best information available"
for any missing facts. New procedures, however, are aimed at using
more accurate data. The Commerce Department now examines all of
the facts on record and subsequently determines the most appropriate
information for use. This information must be corroborated by
independent sources if possible. See Suchman & Mathews, supra note
62, at 33-34.
70 See Schonfeld, supra note 68, at 16.
7" Robert Z. Lawrence & Charles L. Schultze, Summary, in AN
AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 42, 44.
7 See id.
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forty different steel products.7" One estimate predicts that
consumers subsidized protected U.S. steel jobs at a rate of
$22,000 per job saved. v
A few commentators view U.S. antidumping laws as
harmful to trading partners.75 In fact, the laws often
impose disproportionate penalties, such as tariffs up to
377%, on corporations found guilty of dumping.76 The
United States' strong protectionist bent has led commenta-
tors to believe that "penalties like these are unlikely to end
[even] ... if Congress approves the [GATT]."77  This
assumption is probably correct, in part because the imple-
menting legislation is not true to the General Agreement.
Effectively, the GATT is deteriorating as a result of growing
protectionism in the form of "nontariff barriers,"7" particu-
larly in countries like the United States.79
4. TBE URUGUAY RouND AGREEMENTS
The Uruguay Round Agreements were formally complet-
ed on April 15, 1994, with the signing of the Marrakesh
Declaration. ° The representatives of attending nations
agreed that the new GATT should be in force by January 1,
1995.8'
Historically, the United States has returned from GATT
negotiating rounds with large net gains.8 2 The Uruguay
71 See id.
7" See id.
7 See McGee, supra note 3, at 562. McGee notes that because of
U.S. antidumping policy, "two-thirds of the companies producing acrylic
sweaters in Taiwan went out of business. This does not do much for
international relations." Id.
76 See Schonfeld, supra note 68, at 18.
77Id.
7' Lawrence & Schultze, supra note 67, at 71 (citing Rudiger W.
Dornbusch, Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case for Bilateralism,
in AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 106).
7 See discussion infra § 5.
o See Communication from the Chairman, Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, 11 April 1994, reprinted in MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 12, at 2039.
81 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 12, at 1326.
' Telephone Interview with Richard Steinberg, Professor of
International Law, University of California at Berkeley (Nov. 6, 1994)
1995]
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Round was not a loss'for the United States, but with
membership changes and changing world demographics, the
United States no longer dominated negotiations." Nations
wishing to trade on a competitive basis with the United
States were able to ensure that the Antidumping Article
was reworked so that the United States would be forced to
abandon some of the protections then afforded to domestic
producers.8 4 Benefits to the United States included "re-
stricting some of the arbitrary practices of other countries
with respect to application of their antidumping ...
laws."
85
The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotia-
tions analyzed the outcome of the Uruguay Round in light
of U.S. objectives. The Advisory Committee identified the
broad antidumping objectives as those articulated by
Congress in the 1988 Trade Act. 6 The Advisory Commit-
tee reaffirmed the U.S. goals of defining, deterring, and
otherwise discouraging unfair trade practices.8 7  The
objectives more specifically focus on ensuring fairness for
U.S. exporters, establishing remedies against importers who
evade antidumping orders, and maintaining the effective-
ness of then-current U.S. antidumping laws as much as
possible."8
(notes on file with author) [hereinafter Steinberg Interview].
' See generally JEROME, supra note 7, at 225-26.
8 See id. at 225.
85 THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS,
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE CONCERNING THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 3
(1994) [hereinafter ACTPN REPORT].
86 See id.
87 See id. at 86 (noting that unfair trade practices included "forms
of subsidy and dumping and other practices not adequately covered
such as resource input subsidies, diversionary dumping, dumped or
subsidized inputs, and export targeting practices").
' See id. at 86-87. The specific objectives of the United States in
the Uruguay Round were to:
(1) strengthen and make more transparent the standards for
the conduct of all countries' antidumping investigations so that
U.S. exporters are not treated unfairly in foreign antidumping
proceedings, (2) establish explicit remedies against circumven-
tion or evasion of antidumping orders, and (3) maintain the
functional and methodological effectiveness of the U.S. anti-
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Prior to the adoption of the Uruguay Round, the Anti-
dumping Code of 1979 governed international dumping
policies.8 9 This Code was drafted during the GATT's
Tokyo Round," largely under the influence of the United
States.9 1 The Uruguay Round substantially altered this
Code," which has subsequently forced the rewriting of
U.S. antidumping provisions. In June 1994, Senators
Baucus and Danforth sent a letter to the Clinton Adminis-
tration warning "that the GATT agreement will require a
number of 'substantial' changes to U.S. trade law."9s The
Advisory Committee concurred that "the Antidumping
Agreement contains provisions that may affect U.S. anti-
dumping laws and practices."9' U.S. exporters supported
dumping law by resisting changes to the Antidumping Code
which might require the weakening [of] U.S. law.
Id.
89 See Kassinger, supra note 29, at 7.
90 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 12, at 674.
91 See Kassinger, supra note 29, at 7.
9 See Statement of Administrative Action, Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VI, reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 12, at 807 [hereinafter Statement of Administrative Action].
" GATT: Baucus, Danforth Offer Proposals to Implement GATT
Trade Agreement, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, 1019, 1019 (June
29, 1994) [hereinafter Baucus, Danforth Letter].
9 ACTPN REPORT, supra note 85, at 87-88. The Report further
noted that:
[s]ome of these provisions were supported by U.S. industries
concerned with access to foreign markets and maintaining their
competitiveness in the face of foreign countries [sic] antidumpi-
ng laws and access to foreign-made components to maintain
their competitiveness. Other U.S. industries opposed [these
provisions] because of concerns about unfair trade practices by
foreign companies in U.S. markets.
Id. The Advisory Committee found the most notable provisions to be:
(1) rules for conducting cost of production tests, specifically for
(a) a period of measurement, (b) the threshold before ignoring
below-cost sales, and (c) for evaluating start-up operations; (2)
rules containing options for calculating profit in constructed
value calculations; (3) rules containing options for comparing
transaction-specific export prices with weighted-average prices
in the comparison market; (4) rules for determining when a
dumping margin is de minimis and when the level of imports is
negligible, both of which determine whether an antidumping
case can be prosecuted; (5) rules for determining whether the
petitioner or petitioners represent a sufficient portion of the
domestic industry to have standing to file the petition; and (6)
19951 579
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
5 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
many of the provisions which would relax the U.S. market.
On the other hand, U.S. producers targeting the domestic
market opposed them.
The Uruguay Round Agreements proved to be a positive
round of negotiations for the United States.9 5 Economists
have predicted that the resulting benefit to the United
States will be a one percent per year increase in economic
growth by the year 2004.16 Additionally, they believe "that
net U.S. exports will increase by about $20 billion by [the
year] 2000, leading to the creation of at least 250,000
jobs."9" In its critical analysis of the Uruguay Round
Agreement, the Institute for International Economics
awarded the GATT a ' B+" and urged quick congressional
adoption of implementing legislation. While the entire
Uruguay Round garnered a B+, the antidumping provisions
received a C+ and were reported to be in need of further
improvement."
In the final General Agreement, the United States drew
both victories and losses. Victories included preservation of
the right of workers to file and support petitions and the
use of cumulative analysis99 in injury determinations."0
rules requiring a reexamination every five years during the life
of an antidumping order of whether the injury likely would
continue if the order were revoked (and revocation if it would
not).
Id. at 88 (numbers added to text).
" GATT organizers "say the agreement could boost U.S. income by
$122 billion by the year 2005; others predict more modest gains; but all
show positive net effects." Cindy Tursman, GATT Revisited: Key
Provisions of the Trade Pact, Bus. CREDIT., Mar. 1995, at 21, 21.
' See International Trade: U.S. Growth Will Increase By 1 Percent
a Year Because of GATT Pact, Study Says, Management Briefing (BNA),
Nov. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Curnws File
(commenting on a study by Jeffrey J. Schott and Johanna W. Buurman
at the Institute for International Economics).97 Id.
8 See Hill Briefs, NATL JOURNAL'S CONGRESSDAILY, Nov. 1, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cngdly File.
' In determining the necessity of imposing antidumping penalties,
a "cumulative analysis" means "cumulatively assess[ing] the volume
and effect of imports of the subject merchandise from all countries...
if such imports compete with each other and with domestic products in
the United States market." H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 224
(1994), reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 12, at
165.
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The losses included creation of "new standards for deter-mining whether dumping margins are de minimis... and
a new five year 'sunset' review provision."'O' The United
States attempted to minimize the impact of these losses
through careful crafting of the implementing legisla-
tion.
10 2
5. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
There is a strong tension between congressional support
for U.S. industrial interests and the level of free trade that
the GATT requires U.S. laws to provide. Congressional
attempts to reconcile these competing interests proved to be
so divisive that the trade subcommittee surrendered control
of the antidumping issues and left resolution to the full
committee." 3 In fact, a letter from a bipartisan group of
the House Ways and Means Committee to the Clinton
Administration indicated that "the members would not
welcome proposals to 'weaken' U.S. trade law, dealing with,
in particular, short supply or application of new averaging
and de minimis requirements to reviews. " 10 4 Averaging
and de minimis requirements were later dealt with cau-
tiously in the Clinton Administration's proposals, which
may have helped to get them passed, but which may also
prove to violate the GATT.' °5
In a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor,
Senators Baucus and Danforth stated that "'U.S. trade laws
have been critical to promoting both U.S. economic growth
and the effectiveness of the international system.'""' 6
Because of the importance of the trade laws, the Senators
were apprehensive about changes and warned that the
implementing legislation would be critical to avoid weaken-
100 See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 92, at 807.
101 Id.
102 See discussion infra § 5.
103 See GATT: Split Widens Among House Republicans Over
Dumping Provisions of GATT Bill, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26,
1018, 1019 (June 29, 1994). Such support was not unanimous, however,
as other members of Congress took less critical stances on the provi-
sions. Id.
104 Id. at 1018-19.
105 See discussion infra § 6.8.
"' Baucus, Danforth Letter, supra note 93, at 1019.
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ing these laws.' °7 The Senators feared injury to U.S.
industries and workers if the laws were indeed weak-
ened."' There appears to be a basic refusal among sever-
al members of Congress to accept the notion that in order
to support and be a part of freer global trade, the United
States must also practice less protectionism. This attitude
characterizes several of the provisions of the implementing
legislation.0 9
Senators Baucus and Danforth have made several
recommendations regarding the implementing legislation in
an effort to protect U.S. industries, including an insistence
that a sound antidumping remedy continue to be an
integral element of a functioning U.S. trade policy.10°
Specifically, they recommend that the implementing
legislation not place unnecessary burdens on trade situa-
tions in order to meet standing requirements and should
exclude related parties from the definition of domestic
injury"' Legislation that excludes related industries
limits the reach of the GATT regulations. Although GATT's
requirement that twenty-five percent of the domestic
industry support the petition helps to ensure technical
compliance,"' the language defining the pool of petition-
ers excludes related parties who may or may not be directly
harmed. The pool is therefore highly concentrated with
parties that are more likely to be harmed. This, in turn,
means that it will be easier to achieve the stated GATT
objective of twenty-five percent of a domestic industry in
support of an investigation."'
Senators Baucus and Danforth also propose that the
implementing legislation should "limit the time period
during which costs must be adjusted for 'start-up' opera-
tions to the period prior to commercial production.
"114
Constricting the period that the United States considers
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See discussion infra § 6.
10 See Baucus, Danforth Letter, supra note 93, at 1020.
. See id.
1 See Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, at 1453, 1460.
13 See id.
1 Baucus, Danforth Letter, supra note 93, at 1020.
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"start-up" obviously creates more instances of what the
Commerce Department determines to be dumping."5 The
Senators further suggest that the legislation should
"provide for 'fair comparison' of the home market price and
the export price.""' This expands the potential for a
dumping determination because even if a foreign producer
sells below cost in the home market,"7 the producer will
be penalized for selling below market price in the United
States. At least one critic has noted the inequity inherent
in this provision, commenting that "all post-Christmas-
season sales would have to be banned if U.S. antidumping
law is to be enforced evenhandedly."" 8
Lastly, Baucus and Danforth insist the legislation must
also "ensure[] that U.S. industries obtain relief under U.S.
law whenever unfairly traded imports are a cause of
material injury, rather than the sole, principal, or largest
cause of injury.""9 This provision would allow for a very
broad scope of duty application, particularly since the GATT
imposes duties on dumping entities which would normally
be exempted because of a de minimis margin. Under the
Senators' plan, these de minimis foreign producers would be
included in the analysis because they would be cumulated
with other, more egregious dumping entities.
In responding to the Uruguay Round, it is important for
U.S. political leaders to remember that the purpose of the
implementing legislation is to alter U.S. laws in order to
conform them to GATT principles.2 0 Of course, virtually
all bills that ratify trade treaties contain "extraneous"
material; thus, in the implementing legislation, U.S.
antidumping laws go further than the General Agreement
"' See discussion infra § 6.3.
116 Baucus, Danforth Letter, supra note 93, at 1020.
17 A producer may sell below cost for reasons such as liquidation,
termination of a product line, or obsolescence due to improved
technology.
118 Japan Develops Economic Theories to Parry Thrusts at Trading
Practices, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1667, 646, 647
(June 9, 1994) (quoting Professor Bhagwati of Columbia University)
[hereinafter Japan Develops].
19 Baucus, Danforth Letter, supra note 93, at 1020.
120 See William E. Frenzel, GATT Gains: Freer Trade Promises
Global Dividends, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 9, 1994, at G1, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, West File.
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changes.1 21 Congress' continued favoring of protectionism,
however, has not gone unnoticed by free trade support-
ers.122  An attorney opposing steel-favored GATT provi-
sions recently stated: "Congress has gone too far in
favoring petitioners' side in the debate. ""' This attorney
warned that the effect would be to free "other countries [to]
enact similar changes in their laws, to the detriment of U.S.
exports."12 4 In addition, a Japanese editorial called upon
"the U.S. government... not to endanger the function of
the WTO by resorting to unilateral measures without due
consideration."
12 5
6. U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION VERSUS THE GATT:
LIKELY CHALLENGES TO THE U.S. TRADE BILL
This section examines eight specific antidumping issues
and discusses the relationship between the GATT and the
U.S. implementing legislation. 126 These issues are highly
controversial, as evidenced by Congress' unwillingness to
confront them directly. Discussion of each issue will
include the language of the General Agreement, followed by
the language of the implementing bill, 127 and finally this
author's analysis of why the implementing bill's provisions
121 See id.
122 See WTO Should Not Be Hamstrung, DAILY YOMIURI, Dec. 4,
1994 at 6, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
'2 Bill Schmitt, Compromise Tethers Pension Reform with Strings
Tied to GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Steel Industry
Pension Funds), AM. METAL MARKET, Sept. 23, 1994, at 2, available in
1994 WL 2895739.
124 Id.
'2 WTO Should Not Be Hamstrung, supra note 122. The editorial
stated that "[c]ongressional approval of strengthened antidumping
regulations . .. will serve only to bolster unilateral U.S. measures
against its trade partners. These moves run counter to the WTO's goal
of promoting freer trade through international cooperation." Id.
126 Article VI of the Uruguay Round Agreement states the objectives
of the Membership with regard to antidumping. The Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 is "international implementing legislation" drafted by the
signatories. The implementing legislation for the United States is
contained in H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
12' The implementing bill is also referred to as the implementing
language or the Trade Bill.
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are vulnerable to challenge under the GATT.'28
' The following excerpt is from Summary of H.R. 5110, "Uruguay
Round Agreements Act" Prepared by Clinton Administration, Introduced
Sept. 27, 1994, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Sept. 29, 1994,
available in 1994 WL DER 187 d90:
AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI OF THE GATT
1994 (relating to antidumping)
*Establishes clearer and substantially more detailed rules
governing the measurement of the margin of dumping,
conduct of the antidumping investigation (including
standing), assessment and collection of duties, and other
aspects of antidumping practice. Key areas covered include
standing requirements, average to average comparison
requirements in investigations, treatment of sales below
cost, calculation of profits in constructed value situations
and new shipper rates.
*Preserves largely unchanged existing injury test.
*Includes a requirement that the U.S. International Trade
Commission conduct a review every five years as to whether
injury would be likely to continue or recur if the antidump-
ing order was lifted, and for the order to be terminated
unless the Commission reaches an affirmative finding.
*Includes significant due process and transparency require-
ments to protect exporters subject to antidumping investiga-
tions.
TITLE II (OF H.R. 5110) AMENDS U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW TO:
*[E]stablish a new fair comparison methodology that
deducts the importer's profit from the U.S. price and
provides for level of trade adjustments in the foreign
market;
*[R]equire a mandatory injury review every five years
("sunset" review);
*[R]equire an examination of duty absorption in the context
of sunset review, on request;
*[R]equire in general that U.S. and foreign market prices be
compared on an average-to-average basis in investigations,
while providing a preference for average-to-individual
comparisons in reviews;
*[E]stablish a special adjustment for start-up production
costs;
*[E]stablish a special provision for captive production;
*[Ilmprove existing anticircumvention provisions; and
*[M]ake other technical and conforming amendments to
bring U.S. antidumping law into conformity with the
Agreement.
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6.1. Fair Comparison: Level of Trade
Article 2.4 of the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in 1994129 provides that the country conducting an investi-
gation shall make a fair comparison between the export
price and the normal value of imported products.3 0 In
order to be fair, the Antidumping Agreement requires that
comparisons be made at the same level of trade.' This
requirement means that the price of goods must be com-
pared at the same point in the production process, which is
normally the "ex-factory level." 32 Allowances must also
be made for other differences that affect price comparabili-
ty, including differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, quantities, and physical characteristics. 13 3  The
Statement of Administrative Action1 34  defers to the
Clinton Administration's interpretation of this GATT
provision, referring to Article 2.4 as a guideline and merely
noting that comparisons should be fair.'35
Section 224 of the implementing bill1 6 defines "deter-
mining normal value" as "the price at which the foreign like
product is first sold ... for consumption in the exporting
country, in the usual commercial quantities and in the
ordinary course of trade ... ."13' The Trade Bill provides
that this price will be increased or decreased to make
allowances for differences in price "that [are] shown to be
wholly or partly due to a difference in level of trade
'2 See Appendix I of this Comment for the full text.o See Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, at 1455.
"' See id.
132 See id. "Ex-factory level" refers to the product price as the
product first leaves the production stage. Marketing costs, shipping
costs, and other cost variables are not included in the ex-factory level
determination. Id.
133 See id.
134 See Appendix II of this Comment for the full text.
131 See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 92, at 809.
131 See Appendix III of this Comment for the full text.
137 H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 224 (1994), reprinted in
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 12, at 180-81. This bill has
subsequently been codified as Ur. Rnd. Agree. Act, Pub. L. No.103-465,
108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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between the export price ... and normal value." 3 ' The
implementing legislation qualifies that the adjustment
should only be made if the difference in level of trade can
be attributed to "different selling activities" where the
difference "is demonstrated to affect price comparabili-
ty."
139
The language in the GATT stresses the importance of a
fair comparison. The implementing language is structured
in a way that facilitates the United States' compliance with
the GATT. The language, however, also leaves room for the
United States to maneuver and achieve ends that are
incompatible with the goals of the General Agreement. For
instance, while the GATT simply states that level of trade
adjustments shall be made, the Trade Bill adds a prerequi-
site to this instruction that adjustments should be made
only if the difference can be attributed to different selling
activities and the difference actually affects the comparison.
Furthermore, the burden on a respondent to establish that
a level of trade adjustment should be made may be too high
for any party to meet, which results in a failure to make an
adjustment or determine "less than fair value."
Failure to make a sufficient level of trade adjustments
may make the provision vulnerable to a GAT challenge
because the DOC or International Trade Commission might
not make fair comparisons. Further evidence of the
implementing language's non-conformity with the GATT is
the disparity between its principles and the tenets of the
1979 Code. The 1979 Code provision was "specifically
rewritten" during the Uruguay Round.'40 Drafters sought
to create a fair comparison requirement to be used by all
member countries that would not be controlled by, nor
dependent upon, the calculation of normal value.'"
Analysts note that the implementing language resounds of
the 1979 Code, "thereby potentially defining ... 'fair
138 Id. at 187.
139 Id.
140 O'Melveny & Myers, Analysis of the U.S. Administration's
Antidumping Legislation, In-House Document, at 7, (Oct. 1994) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business
Law) [hereinafter O'Melveny & Myers].
4 See id.
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comparison' as whatever methodology [the Commerce
Department] uses."142  The legislation creates a more
stringent burden in response to court decisions that have
favored fairly simple levels of trade adjustments."
Rewriting definitions and heightening burdens may have
the effect of voiding previous decisions favoring respon-
dents.
6.2. Fair Comparison: Constructed Value
The Antidumping Agreement1 " declares that where
there is no export price or where it appears that the export
price is unreliable, "the export price may be constructed on
the basis of the price at which the imported products are
first resold to an independent buyer . .. ."145 In contrast
to this simple dictate from the Antidumping Agreement, the
implementing legislation furnishes a complicated set of
instructions for determining constructed value. 146  Lan-
guage from the implementing bill147 directs that the
constructed value of imported merchandise shall be equal
to the sum of the cost of materials and processing for an
ordinary business period, the cost of selling the product
(such as administrative expenses), and expenses incidental
to shipping the product to the United States."
142 Id.
143 See, e.g., Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 622 F.
Supp. 1071, 1078 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), on reconsideration, 634 F.
Supp. 419 (Ct. Intl Trade 1985). The Carlisle decision noted that in
antidumping cases, adjustments for differences affecting price compara-
bility:
may be required where purchasers perform different functions
in the distribution network which result in different costs. A
level of trade adjustment is appropriate where, for example,
sales are made in one market to wholesalers who do their own
warehousing, invoicing and marketing and in the other market
to retailers who do not.
Id. "d 4 See Appendix I of this Comment for the full text of Article 2.4 of
the Antidumping Agreement.
145 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 2.3, at 1455.
146 See H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 224, at 196.
141 See Appendix IV of this Comment for the full text.
148 See H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 224, at 196-98. The Trade Bill
also anticipates the possibility that perfect data may not be available
for these costs. In such a case, the Commerce Department may
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The disparity between the GATT and the implementing
bill lies in the latter's limitation to sales above cost. It is
likely that this provision will be challenged if it is found
that the Commerce Department is using this definition in
order to expand the types of cases which can be adjudicated
against foreign importers in the United States. The
implementing bill may actually facilitate violation of the
GATT's "fair comparison" requirement by allowing "the
deduction to the foreign market price [to be] 'capped' by the
amount of indirect selling expenses deducted from the U.S.
starting price."'49 This will result in disparate deductions
made for the same expenses from the U.S. starting price (all
expenses) and the foreign market starting price (only some
expenses). The Statement of Administrative Action offers
no policy rationale for the cap and there is no support for
such a cap in the Antidumping Agreement. 5 ° In addition,
"while profit will be deducted from the U.S. starting price,
no profit will be deducted from the foreign market starting
price. The resulting comparison of constructed export price
and normal value will be a skewed, apples-to-oranges
comparison,"' which may cause the DOC to levy unfair
duties.
calculate the constructed value in one of three ways. The DOC may
make a finding based on actual costs and profits realized on merchan-
dise that is in the same general category of products as the subject
merchandise. Alternatively, the Commerce Department may take the
weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized for costs
and profits associated with "the production and sale of a foreign like
product." Id. at 197. Finally, the DOC may use any other reasonable
method in calculating expenses and profits "except that the amount
allowed for profit may not exceed the amount normally realized by
exporters or producers.., of merchandise that is in the same general
category" as the product under investigation. Id. at 198. Using any of
these methods of calculation, the cost of materials shall be determined
without regard to internal taxes of the exporting country. See id.
Each of these methods assumes actual data, not necessarily
pertaining directly to the product at issue, but comparable in some way.
"Under current U.S. law, [the DOC] uses specified minimum percentag-
es rather than actual data to calculate profit and general selling and
administrative costs." Statement of Administrative Action, supra note
92, at 809. See generally Appendix V of this Comment for text from the
implementing bill discussing the constructed price offset.
' O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 140, at 10.
150 See id.
151 Id.
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The United States may further violate the spirit of the
GATT by its interpretation of the term "like product." At
least one court has given the term an expansive definition,
holding "like product" to be within the "class or kind" of
merchandise at issue.'52 If expanded definitions of "like
product" are used, the United States may assess duties
against importers for which there would be no basis to do
so if the product's effect on domestic industries had been
examined separately from the actual product at issue.
6.3. Start-Up: Commercial Production & Types of
Investment
A determination of dumping turns on whether the
product is being sold at less than normal value. Therefore,
knowledge of the product's price in its home market is
necessary. Sometimes there are no sales or a low volume
of sales of the "like product" in the domestic market of the
exporting country, rendering a proper comparison extremely
difficult. In these instances, the margin of dumping can be
determined by comparison with the cost of production, in
addition to a reasonable amount for administrative, selling,
and general costs, and for profits. 5 ' These costs must be
determined "on the basis of records kept by the exporter or
producer."5 4 Moreover, costs are to be adjusted for situa-
tions where start-up operations influence the costs during
the period of investigation.'5 5 The Antidumping Agree-
ment156 further requires that adjustments for start-up
operations "reflect the costs at the end of the start-up
12 Sony Corp. of America v. United States, 13 Ct. Intl Trade 353,
360 (1989). "Trinitron" color picture tubes were properly included
within a final affirmative injury determination in an antidumping
proceeding, even though a domestic producer-importer claimed that the
tube occupied a discrete and insular segment of the market not in
competition with other color picture tubes. The tube was part of a class
or kind of merchandise for which an affirmative injury determination
was made and was found to be a like product "within the class or kind
of merchandise ... [found] to be sold at less than fair value," so the
product had to be included in the injury determination. Id.
15 See Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 2.2, at
1453.
154 Id. art. 2.2.1.1, at 1454.
155 Id.
156 See Appendix VI of this Comment for the full text.
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period or... the most recent costs which can reasonably be
taken into account ... .""' The Antidumping Agreement
thus prevents companies from being penalized for dumping
during the start-up period where costs almost universally
will exceed prices due to normal business practices.
The implementing legislation' states that adjust-
ments shall be made when "costs incurred during the time
period covered by the investigation ... are affected by
start[-]up operations."15 9  Despite this beginning, the
implementing legislation proceeds to limit adjustments for
start-up operations to situations where substantial addition-
al investment is required because of a new product or new
production facilities and where production levels are low
due to technical factors associated with start-up. 60 The
Commerce Department is also allowed to consider factors
unrelated to start-up operations in assessing whether
commercial production levels have been achieved. 6' The
attainment of peak production levels will not be used to
signal the end of the start-up period."6 2 The Statement of
Administrative Action instead reasons that the start-up
period may end long before a company is able to achieve
optimum capacity.'63 It also instructs that "[t]o determine
when a company reaches commercial production levels, [the
DOC] will consider first the actual production experience of
the merchandise in question. Production levels will be
measured based on units processed."'64
The implementing legislation's narrow wording is in
conflict with the GATT. Moreover, potential for further
conflict exists depending on how the provision is applied by
the Commerce Department. The General Agreement allows
for start-up adjustment based on production and sales costs.
The implementing legislation, however, "limits the adjust-
ment for start-up to production costs." 65 In addition, the
157 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, at 1454 n.6.
158 See Appendix VII of this Comment for the full text.
19 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 224, at 200.
16 See id.
'6' See id.
' See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 92, at 836.
' See id.
164 Id.
16 O1Melveny & Myers, supra note 140, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
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implementing legislation potentially excludes from adjust-
ment start-up producers that the General Agreement would
include. For example, under the implementing legislation,
the DOC will exclude from adjustment producers whose
production levels are low due to non-technical factors or
who have not made substantial additional investments.
This disparity renders the implementing legislation vulner-
able to challenge by producers that are discriminated
against because their sales costs are not taken into account.
The Statement of Administrative Action further indi-
cates that production levels will be measured based on units
processed rather than on merchandise units of commercial
quality. This allowance could greatly limit the duration of
the start-up period, which could cause U.S. legislation to
violate the GATT. The manner in which the Commerce
Department applies the provision, permitting it to consider
factors unrelated to start-up operations that may have
affected the volume of production, must be monitored to
ensure that the exception does not overwhelm the rule. The
implementing legislation requires that "companies under-
take 'substantial additional investment' and that low
production levels during start-up be caused by 'technical
factors.'"'66 The same requirements, however, are not
found in the GATT. These are extra burdens that the
United States has unilaterally imposed on producers in
order to make the start-up adjustment.
6.4. Actual Profit
Article 2.2.2 of the Antidumping Agreement'6 7 states
that when determining dumping margins, "profit" shall be
determined based on actual data. 6 ' The methods of
calculation to be employed are the same as those for
determining cost,169 which were discussed in section 6.3
of this Comment. The implementing legislation,170 howev-
er, promulgates a formula for ascertaining profits: "[P]rofit
166 Id.
'7 See Appendix VIII of this Comment for the full text.
16 See Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 2.2.2, at
1454.
'6 See id.
170 See Appendix IX of this Comment for the full text.
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shall be an amount determined by multiplying the total
actual profit by the applicable percentage." 171 The State-
ment of Administrative Action further illuminates the
meaning of "actual profit" in Article 2.2.2.172 The State-
ment indicates that the Commerce Department will
calculate profit only on amounts realized in connection with
sales "in the ordinary course of trade."173 The DOC may
ignore sales that it disregards as a basis for normal value,
such as those made at below-cost prices. Therefore, the
Commerce Department would use only profitable sales as
the basis for calculating profit.
Because the Commerce Department uses actual data in
determining whether pricing constitutes dumping, as
opposed to statutorily-fixed minimum percentages, margins
will not be inflated. This practice preserves the intent of
the GATT. The alternative formulae for calculating profit,
however, which are invoked when actual data is not
available, are based on "specified minimum percentag-
es," 74 thereby increasing the amount of profit deductible.
The GATT, by contrast, does not limit the alternative
calculations to above-cost sales. If this procedure results in
the United States finding respondents guilty of dumping
when they would not be guilty under the General Agree-
ment, the United States will be at fault.
6.5. Negligibility
Article 5.8 of the Antidumping Agreement 175 states
that "[the volume of dumped imports shall normally be
regarded as negligible if the volume of dumped imports
from a particular country... account[s] for less than [three
percent] of imports of the like product in the importing
171 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 223, at 178. "Applicable percent-
age" refers to the percentage yielded by dividing the total United States
expenses by the total expenses of the foreign producer. Id. "Total
United States expenses" generally refers to the expenses incurred with
respect to the subject merchandise sold in the United States. Id.-R See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 92, at 809.
173 Id.
174 In addition, the statement parenthetically defines "production
and sales in the ordinary course of trade" as "data pertaining to above-
cost sales." Id.
175 See Appendix X of this Comment for the full text.
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Member ... .176 If, however, "countries which individual-
ly account for less than [three percent] collectively account
for more than [seven percent] of imports of the like product
in the importing Member," these imports must not be
regarded as negligible. 1" Conversely, the implementing
bill178 pegs imports as negligible when they "account for less
than [three percent] of the volume of all such merchandise
imported into the United States" during the twelve-month
period immediately preceding the filing of the petition or
initiation of the investigation. 179  Imports that would
otherwise be negligible, however, are excepted if they
comprise over seven percent of the volume of all such
imports when combined with other imports of like product
during the same twelve-month period.8 0 In determining
aggregate volume, the implementing bill omits countries
with a negative dumping determination from consider-
ation.18 1 Furthermore, imports must not be treated as
negligible if there is a chance that-impending imports from
a previously described country will account for more than
three percent or that the combined volume will exceed
seven percent.1
8 2
The implementing legislation imposes an absolute
numerical threshold for negligibility. Accordingly, the effect
on domestic industries will not be taken into account in
determining negligibility. The Antidumping Agreement,
however, imposes a less rigorous standard through use of
the word "normally."8' Consequently, the implementing
bill may be vulnerable to GATT challenge on three grounds.
First, the implementing bill sharply departs from the
Antidumping Agreement by stipulating that the Commerce
Department only look to the immediately preceding twelve-
month period. This period is most likely to have an average
exceeding three percent because the dumping allegedly
176 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 5.8, at 1460.
177 Id.
178 See Appendix XI of this Comment for the full text.
179 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 222, at 162.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 163, 166.
182 See id. at 163.
"s See Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 5.8, at
1460.
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occurred during these months. Additionally, this practice
skews the analysis in favor of a determination of non-
negligibility and dumping. Second, the exclusion of coun-
tries with a negative dumping determination from a
determination of aggregate volume further skews the
analysis whereby the fairly-priced volumes from these
countries will not be allowed to offset the volume of dumped
imports. Finally, unlike the implementing language, the
Antidumping Agreement makes no mention of discounting
negligibility on the threat that imports may imminently
account for three percent of the volume of certain merchan-
dise.
6.6. Causation
Article 3.5 of the Antidumping Agreement'8 4 requires
a demonstration that the dumped imports are causing
injury.'85 Factors other than dumping may also cause
injury to domestic producers and must also be accounted
for. Injury from these other sources must not be attributed
to the dumped imports. 8' No provision in the implement-
ing legislation, however, specifically addresses causation.
Prior to passage of the GATT in 1994, petitioners were not
required to demonstrate that imports were the sole or even
the major cause of injury to the U.S. industry.' The
Statement of Administrative Action asserts that "[eixisting
U.S. law and legislative history fully implement the
causation standard of the 1979 Codes," given that the
General Agreement "do[es] not change the causation
standard from that provided in the 1979 Tokyo Round
Codes."'88 Therefore, "existing U.S. law fully implements
Articled 3.5 .. ..,9
The absence of any specific implementing language
requiring a causal link, however, renders this issue vulnera-
ble to challenge. Judicial history has not consistently
18 See Appendix XII of this Comment for the full text.
185 See Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 3.5, at
1457.
186 See id.
187 See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 92, at 851.
18 Id.
189 Id.
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required a causal relationship between dumped imports and
injury, nor has it distinguished between injury caused by
dumped imports and injury caused by other factors."
The lack of a causation requirement, if exploited by peti-
tioners in the United States, is potentially the most volatile
part of the implementing legislation.
6.7. Sunset: Injury Continuation/Duty Absorption
The "sunset"'9' provisions were a victory for smaller
and less well-developed countries in the Uruguay Round
negotiations.'92 Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agree-
ment193 provides that "any definitive anti[idumping duty
shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from
its imposition (or from the date of the most recent review)
.... 194 Duties will not be terminated if the authority
determines, in a review initiated prior to the date of
expiration, that the expiration of the duty "would be likely
to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
The duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such
a review."195  Article 3.3 of the Antidumping Agree-
ment'9 6 additionally instructs that where product imports
from more than one county are subject to antidumping
inquiries concurrently, the effects of such imports may be
cumulatively assessed if there is more than a de minimis
margin of dumping and a cumulative evaluation assessment
"s See, e.g., ICC Indus., Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 694 (Fed.
Cir. 1987). The court explained that "antidumping statutes impose a
duty when a foreign producer prices the exported merchandise at...
[less than fair value] and sales of that merchandise cause or threaten
to cause material injury to a domestic industry." Id. at 697 (emphasis
added).
191 "Sunset indicates the termination of a dumping duty assessment
against a producer, if no other action is taken, after five years have
passed. These provisions specify an end-point for the levying of an
antidumping duty which activates automatically rather than requiring
resqondent to petition for termination.
92 Steinberg Interview, supra note 82.
193 See Appendix XIII of this Comment for the full text. The
following discussion of the General Agreement language applies to
sections 6.7.1 and 6.7.2 of this Comment.
194 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 11.3, at 1468.
'95 id. at 1469.
19 See Appendix XIV of this Comment for the full text.
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is proper. 97
6.7.1. Injury Continuation
The implementing bill1 98 provides that in the case of a
five-year review, the antidumping order shall not be
revoked if the Commerce Department or the International
Trade Commission makes a determination that dumping
and material injury "would be likely to continue or re-
cur."199 Moreover, the Trade Bill states that "the Com-
mission shall determine whether revocation of an order...
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of
material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time."
200
In addition, the ITC must take into account "prior injury
determinations,.., whether any improvement in the state
of the industry is related to the order. .. , [and] whether
the industry is vulnerable to material injury ... ."2o1
Furthermore, the ITC also must note that the effects may
not be impending and may make themselves evident only
after the passage of a longer period of time.
Although the implementing bill enables certain orders to
be designated "sunset," thus limiting the antidumping duty
owed, it also permits significant limitations on the use of
this label. The current implementing legislation neglects to
effectuate Article 3.5 standards 203 because it does not
require ITC consideration of only the effect of dumped
imports.0 4  Moreover, the implementing bill permits
Commerce Department assessment of duties on imports
entering the United States five years after the order and
before the sunset determination occurs, even if the Com-
merce Department and the ITC do not resolve that dumping
197 See Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 3.3, at
1456.
19 See Appendix XV of this Comment for the full text.
199 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 220, at 140.
20 Id. at 144.
201 Id. at 145.
212 See H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 221, at 148.
203 Article 3.5 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the GATT 1994 requires the demonstration of a causal relationship
between dumped imports and injury to the domestic industry. See
Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 3.5, at 1457.
204 See O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 140, at 30.
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and injury are apt to persist or recur."5
Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement permits the
continuing effectiveness of duties pending the result of any
review.206  Therefore, although duties should be deemed
sunset after five years, if a domestic producer petitions for
review, the reviewing agency will continue to assess duties
during the investigation. The Antidumping Agreement
qualifies this continued assessment, however, by instructing
that if the review indicates no further injury, duties
collected after the five-year period should be returned. The
legislation fails to include instructions for the DOC or ITC
to return such duties paid. The potential for abuse by U.S.
producers to punish or harass foreign producers is great,
and, if acted upon, will cause foreign producers to dispute
the validity of the legislation. Moreover, the Trade Bill is
extremely vulnerable to challenge where it allows DOC
consideration of effects which are not imminent.
6.7.2. Duty Absorption
The implementing legislation °7 states that during any
review initiated two or four years after an antidumping
duty order is issued, the administering authority must
decide whether antidumping duties have been"absorbed" by
a foreign enterprise.0 8 The ITC also must consider these
duty absorption findings when conducting a five-year
review.2°9 This duty absorption provision faces likely
challenge because it is not contained in the General
Agreement. Although the provision is not supposed to
apply as a "duty as cost" provision, the Commerce Depart-
ment will have collected data available for use under the
law's reimbursement provision. Accordingly, the DOC could
find that duty reimbursement exists, resulting in higher
duties.
205 See id.
'0' See Appendix XIII of this Comment for the pertinent text.
" See Appendix XVI of this Comment for the full text.
208 See H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 220, at 128-29.
209 See id.
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6.8. De Minimis Dumping Margins
The Antidumping Agreement210 provides that "an
investigation shall be terminated promptly [upon determin-
ing] that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping
or of injury to justify proceeding with the case."211 Where
the margin of dumping is determined to be de minimis,
immediate termination will result.212 A de minimis mar-
gin "is less than [two percent], expressed as a percentage of
the export price."213 The Antidumping Agreement further
clarifies that Uruguay Round provisions apply not only to
investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into
force but also to reviews of existing measures which are
conducted after the date of entry into force. 4
The implementing legislation 215 asserts that "[i]n
making a [preliminary] determination..., the administer-
ing authority shall disregard any weighted average dump-
ing margin that is de minimis ... ." 1 6 A weighted aver-
age dumping margin is de minimis if it is determined to be
less than two percent ad valorem. 17 In making a final
determination with regard to an investigation, "the admin-
istering authority shall [similarly] disregard any weighted
average dumping margin that is de minimis .... " 2 18 The
Statement of Administrative Action provides that "t]his
requirement applies only to investigations[,] and not to
reviews of orders or agreements"219 which directly conflict
with the Antidumping Agreement. Application of de
minimis margins to investigations alone constricts the
language of the Antidumping Agreement. In Article 5.8, the
210 See Appendix XVII of this Comment for the full text.
21 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 5.8, at 1460.
212 See id.
213 Id.
214 See id. art. 18.3, at 1473.
215 See Appendix XVIII of this Comment for the full text.
216 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 213, at 101 (emphasis added).
211 See id. Ad valorem: "A tax levied on... an article of commerce
in proportion to its value, as determined by assessment or appraisal."
BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
218 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 213, at 102 (emphasis added).
219 Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 92, at 844
(emphasis added).
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Antidumping Agreement uses the broader term "cases" in
lieu of limiting de minimis terminations to investiga-
tions.220 Furthermore, Article 18.3 of the Antidumping
Agreement "states that GATT provisions apply to both
investigations and reviews."
21
The Clinton Administration's maintenance of a one-half
percent ad valorem standard for de minimis margins during
reviews will effectively perpetuate a greater number of
cases. Situations in which the dumping margin falls
between one-half and two percent will violate antidumping
policies under U.S. law, but not under the GATT. This
implementation is therefore likely to be challenged, as it
provides a greater barrier to trade than the General
Agreement allows.
7. CONCLUSION
Each of the aforementioned issues will be tested in front
of World Trade Organization panels within the next two to
three years. Although each of these provisions were rewrit-
ten in accord with the Uruguay Round Agreements, none
fully comply with the General Agreement. Congressional
discussions of the GATT and the implementing legislation
demonstrate that these discrepancies are not merely a
matter of semantics. Rather, the wording of the implement-
ing bill is calculated to advance a U.S. agenda that does not
comport with the multinational agenda established during
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.
Although the United States has signed on to a more
radical GATT, it has not shed the last remnants of protec-
tionism. What is the United States attempting to protect?
The congressional answer is "U.S. interests." In reality this
response translates to "U.S. industrial interests." The U.S.
government argues that by protecting domestic producers,
jobs for U.S. citizens are protected. To some degree this is
true, and perhaps there are certain industries for which
this policy yields an overall net benefit.2 2 Overwhelming-
220 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 5.8, at 1460.
221 O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 140, at 21.
222 For example, this policy may yield an overall net benefit for the
steel industry. See discussion supra § 3.2.
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ly, however, the evidence demonstrates that antidumping
laws do more harm than good.
Antidumping measures seem unsupported by traditional
economic theory, defying the notion that the market will
regulate itself.22 Indeed one commentator has defined
antidumping as a form of wealth redistribution, whereby
consumers actively allocate money to producers.224 The
negative impact on consumers presents a strong argument
for dispensing with such measures.22 In addition to
raising product prices and lowering product quality, critics
have accused antidumping laws of destroying jobs and
lowering general standards of living.226
Beyond promoting free trade, rescinding some of the
more stringent aspects of U.S. antidumping laws would
increase U.S. credibility abroad227 and encourage other
countries to play by the rules which the United States
continues to verbally espouse. Tough antidumping laws, on
the other hand, serve to promote the United States'
discriminatory policies in the international economic
arena."2 The adopted implementing legislation strength-
22 See Tyson, supra note 45, at 173.
224 See id. at 174.
21 See Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping
Laws, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 491, 491 (1993).
22 See id.
227 "For the four decades after the Second World War, the United
States took the lead in promoting a liberalization of world trade and the
negotiation of multilateral agreements establishing the 'rules of the
game' for that trade." Bruce K. Mac Laury, Foreword to AN AMERICAN
TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR THE 1990s, supra note 1, at vii. Mac
Laury continues:
Recently that principle has come under increasing attack, and
not just from representatives of older industries trying to ward
off low-wage competition from abroad. The large American
trade deficits of the 1980s, the inroads into domestic and third
world markets by Japan and other industrial countries, and
fears for the future competitiveness of American high-technolo-
gy industries have produced mounting pressure in Congress for
a more aggressive government policy to promote American trade
and retaliate against countries whose practices are termed
unfair.
Id.
228 See Amendment to GATT Bill Could Lower U.S. Living Stan-
dards, Study Says, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1403, 1404 (Sept. 14,
1994). Japan's Economic Planning Agency recently "warned that the
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ens U.S. antidumping laws, symbolizing both the United
States' departure from free trade and progress toward
greater protectionism.
abuse of antidumping measures by 'advanced countries'--apparently
referring to the U.S.-becomes a 'pet tool for protectionists.'" Japan
Develops, supra note 118, at 647.
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APPENDIX I: AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF ARTICLE VI OF THE GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE IN 1994, ARTI-
CLE 2.4:
A fair comparison shall be made between the export price
and the normal value. This comparison shall be made at
the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and
in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same
time. Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its
merits, for differences which affect price comparability,
including differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics,
and any other differences which are also demonstrated to
affect price comparability. In the cases referred to in
paragraph 3 [injury caused by dumping], allowances for
costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between importa-
tion and resale, and for profits accruing, should also be
made. If in these cases price comparability has been
affected, the authorities shall establish the normal value at
a level of trade equivalent to the level of trade of the
constructed export price, or shall make due allowance as
warranted under this paragraph. The authorities shall
indicate to the parties in question what information is
necessary to ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose
an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties. 29
APPENDIX II: STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ACTION ON ARTICLE 2.4, VALUE COMPAR-
ISONS:
Article 2.4 establishes guidelines for comparing normal
value and export price to calculate the margin of dumping.
It includes a general requirement that comparisons be fair
and provides specific requirements to achieve this, including
requirements that comparisons be made at the same level
29 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 2.4, at 1455
(footnote omitted).
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of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and between sales
made as nearly as possible at the same time.' °
APPENDIX III: IMPLEMENTING BILL, § 224,
LEVEL OF TRADE:
The price described in paragraph (1)(B) shall also be
increased or decreased to make due allowance for any
difference (or lack thereof) between the export price or
constructed export price and the price described in para-
graph (1)(B) (other than a difference for which allowance is
otherwise made under this section) that is shown to be
wholly or partly due to a difference in level of trade
between the export price or constructed export price and
normal value, if the difference in level of trade-
(i) involves the performance of different
selling activities; and
(ii) is demonstrated to affect price
comparability, based on a pattern of consistent price
differences between sales at different levels of trade in the
country in which normal value is determined.
In a case described in the preceding sentence, the amount
of the adjustment shall be based on the price differences
between the two levels of trade in the country in which
normal value is determined.23 1
APPENDIX IV: IMPLEMENTING BILL, § 224,
CONSTRUCTED VALUE:
For purposes of this title, the constructed value of imported
merchandise shall be an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) the cost of materials and fabrication or other
processing of any kind employed in producing the merchan-
dise, during a period which would ordinarily permit the
production of the merchandise in the ordinary course of
business;
20 Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 92, at 809.
2,31 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 224, at 187.
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(2) (A) the actual amounts incurred and realized
by the specific exporter or producer being examined in the
investigation or review for selling, general, and administra-
tive expenses, and for profits, in connection with the
production and sale of a foreign like product, in the ordi-
nary course of trade, for consumption in the foreign country,
or
(B) if actual data are not available with
respect to the amounts described in subparagraph (A),
then-
(i) the actual amounts incurred and
realized by the specific exporter or producer being examined
in the investigation or review for selling, general, and
administrative expenses, and for profits, in connection with
the production and sale, for consumption in the foreign
country, of merchandise that is in the same general
category of products as the subject merchandise,
(ii) the weighted average of the actual
amounts incurred and realized by exporters or producers
that are subject to the investigation or review ... for
selling, general, and administrative expenses, and for
profits, in connection with the production and sale of a
foreign like product, in the ordinary course of trade, for
consumption in the foreign country, or
(iii) the amounts incurred and realized for
selling, general, and administrative expenses, and for
profits, based on any other reasonable method, except that
the amount allowed for profit may not exceed the amount
normally realized by exporters or producers.., in connec-
tion with the sale, for consumption in the foreign country,
of merchandise that is in the same general category of
products as the subject merchandise; and
(3) the' cost of all containers ... and all other
expenses incidental to placing the subject merchandise in
condition packed ready for shipment to the United States.
For purposes of paragraph (1), the cost of materials shall be
determined without regard to any internal tax in the
exporting country imposed on such materials or their
disposition which are remitted or refunded upon exportation
1995] 605
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of the subject merchandise produced from such materi-
als.
232
APPENDIXV: IMPLEMENTING BILL, § 224, CON-
STRUCTED EXPORT PRICE OFFSET
When normal value is established at a level of trade which
constitutes a more advanced stage of distribution than the
level of trade of the constructed export price, but the data
available does not provide an appropriate basis to deter-mine under subparagraph (A)(ii) a level of trade adjust-
ment, normal value shall be reduced by the amount of
indirect selling expenses incurred in the country in which
normal value is determined on sales of the foreign like
product but not more than the amount of such expenses for
which a deduction is made under section 772(d)(1)(D).
21
APPENDIX VI: ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT,
ARTICLE 2.2.1.1, START-UP COSTS:
For the purpose of paragraph 2, costs shall normally be
calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or
producer under investigation ... [which] reasonably reflect
the costs associated with the production and sale of the
product under consideration .... Unless already reflected in
the cost allocations under this sub-paragraph, costs shall be
adjusted appropriately for those non-recurring items of cost
which benefit future and/or current production, or for
circumstances in which costs during the period of investiga-
tion are affected by start-up operations."
The adjustment made for start-up operations shall reflect
the costs at the end of the start-up period or, if that period
extends beyond the period of investigation, the most recent
costs which can reasonably be taken into account by the
authorities during the investigation. 5
232 Id. at 196-98.
M3 Id. at 188.
" Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 2.2.1.1, at
1454 (footnote omitted).
23 Id. at n.6.
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APPENDIX VII: IMPLEMENTING BILL, § 224,
START[-]UP COSTS
Costs shall be adjusted appropriately for circumstances in
which costs incurred during the time period covered by the
investigation or review are affected by start[-]up operations.
(ii) START[-]UP OPERATIONS.- Adjustments
shall be made for start[-]up operations only where-
(I) a producer is using new produc-
tion facilities or producing a new product that requires
substantial additional investment, and
(II) production levels are limited by
technical factors associated with the initial phase of
commercial production.
For purposes of subclause (II), the initial phase of commer-
cial production ends at the end of the start[-]up period. In
determining whether commercial production levels have
been achieved, the administering authority shall consider
factors unrelated to start[-]up operations that might affect
the volume of production processed, such as demand,
seasonality, or business cycles.
23 6
APPENDIX VIII: ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT,
ARTICLE 2.2.2, ACTUAL PROFI I.
For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for adminis-
trative, selling and general costs and for profits shall be
based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in
the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the
exporter or producer under investigation. When such
amounts cannot be determined on this basis, the amounts
may be determined on the basis of:
(ii) . ... the weighted average of the actual amounts
incurred and realized by other exporters or producers
subject to investigation in respect of production and sales of
the like product in the domestic market of the country of
236 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 224, at 199-200.
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origin.23
7
APPENDIX IX: IMPLEMENTING BILL, § 223,
ACTUAL PROFIT:
For purposes of this section, the price used to establish
constructed export price shall also be reduced by-
(3) .... the profit allocated to the expenses described in
paragraphs (1) and (2).238
SPECIAL RULE FOR DETERMINING PROFIT.-
(1) For purposes of subsection (d)(3), profit shall be
an amount determined by multiplying the total actual profit
by the applicable percentage.
(2) DEFINITIONS.- For purposes of this subsection-
(A) APPLICABLE PERCENTAGE.- ... the percentage
determined by dividing the total United States expenses by
the total expenses.
(B) TOTAL UNITED STATES EXPENSES.- ... the total
expenses described in subsection (d)(1) and (2).
(C) TOTAL EXPENSES.-... all expenses in the first of
the following categories which applies and which are
incurred by or on behalf of the foreign producer and foreign
exporter of the subject merchandise and by or on behalf of
the United States seller affiliated with the producer or
exporter with respect to the production and sale of such
merchandise:
(i) The expenses incurred with respect to the
subject merchandise sold in the United States and the
foreign like product sold in the exporting country if such
expenses were requested by the administering authority for
the purpose of establishing normal value and constructed
export price.
(ii) The expenses incurred with respect to the
narrowest category of merchandise sold in the United
States and the exporting country which includes the subject
merchandise.
(iii) The expenses incurred with respect to the
2 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 2.2.2, at 1454-
55.
28 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 223, at 176-77.
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narrowest category of merchandise sold in all countries
which includes the subject merchandise.
(D) TOTAL ACTUAL PROFIT.- ... the total profit
earned by the foreign producer, exporter, and affiliated
parties described in subparagraph (C) ['total expenses] with
respect to the sale of the same merchandise for which total
expenses are determined under such subparagraph. 9
APPENDIX X: ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT,
ARTICLE 5.8, NEGLIGIBILITY:
The volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded
as negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a
particular country is found to account for less than 3
percent of imports of the like product in the importing
Member, unless countries which individually account for
less than 3 percent of the imports of the like product in the
importing Member collectively account for more than 7 per
cent of imports of the like product in the importing Mem-
ber.
240
APPENDIX XI: IMPLEMENTING BILL, § 222,
NEGLIGIBILITY-
Except as provided in clauses (ii) and (iv), imports from a
country of merchandise corresponding to a domestic like
product identified by the Commission are 'negligible' if such
imports account for less than 3 percent of the volume of all
such merchandise imported into the United States in the
most recent 12-month period for which data are available
that precedes-
(I) the filing of the petition under
section 702(b) or 732(b), or
(II) the initiation of the investigation,
if the investigation was initiated under section 702(a) or
732(a).
(ii) EXCEPTION.- Imports that would
239 Id. at 178-80.
24 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 5.8, at 1460.
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otherwise be negligible under clause (i) shall not be negligi-
ble if the aggregate volume of imports of the merchandise
from all countries described in clause (i) with respect to
which investigations were initiated on the same day exceeds
7 percent of the volume of all such merchandise imported
into the United States during the applicable 12-month
period.
(iii) DETERMINATION OF AGGREGATE
VOLUME.- In determining aggregate volume under clause
(ii) or (iv), the Commission shall not consider imports from
any country specified in paragraph (7)(G)(ii)2"' [countries
with a negative dumping determination,242 where an
investigation has been terminated,2' designated as a
beneficiary country under the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act,2" or part of a free trade area established
before January 1, 1987].245
(iv) NEGLIGIBILITY IN THREAT ANALYSIS.-
Notwithstanding clauses (i) and (ii), the Commission shall
not treat imports as negligible if it determines that there is
a potential that imports from a country described in clause
(i) will imminently account for more than 3 percent of the
volume of all such merchandise imported into the United
States, or that the aggregate volumes of imports from all
countries described in clause (ii) will imminently exceed 7
percent of the volume of all such merchandise imported into
the United States. The Commission shall consider such
imports only for purposes of determining threat of material
injury.
246
APPENDIX XII: ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT,
ARTICLE 3.5, CAUSATION:
It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are,
through the effects of dumping.., causing injury within
241 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 222, at 162-63.
242 Id. at 166.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 167.
246 Id. at 163.
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the meaning of this Agreement. ... The authorities shall
also examine any known factors other than the dumped
imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic
industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors
must not be attributed to the dumped imports.24
APPENDIX XIII: ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT
ARTICLE 11.3, DURATION AND REVIEW:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any
definitive anti-dumping duty shall be terminated on a date
not later than five years from its imposition (or from the
date of the most recent review under paragraph 2 if that
review has covered both dumping and injury, or under this
paragraph), unless the authorities determine, in a review
initiated before that date on their own initiative or upon a
duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the
domestic industry within a reasonable period of time prior
to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
The duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such
a review.
APPENDIX XIV: ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT,
ARTICLE 3.3, DETERMINATION OF INJURY:
Where imports of a product from more than one country are
simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations, the
investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the
effects of such imports only if they determine that (a) the
margin of dumping established in relation to the imports
from each country is more than de minimis as defined in
paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of imports from
each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assess-
ment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of
the conditions of competition between the imported products
247 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 3.5, at 1457.
2148 Id. art. 11.3, at 1468-69 (footnote omitted).
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and the... domestic like product.249
APPENDIX XV: IMPLEMENTING BILL, §§ 220,
221, INJURY CONTINUATION:
In the case of a review conducted under subsection (c) [five-
year review], the administering authority shall revoke ...
an antidumping order or finding, or terminate a suspended
investigation, unless-
(A) the administering authority makes a determina-
tion that dumping... would be likely to continue or recur,
and
(B) the Commission 50 makes a determination that
material injury would be likely to continue or recur as
described in section 752(a).25'
SEC. 752(A) SPECIAL RULES FOR SECTION 751(B) AND 751(c)
REVIEWS.
252
In a review conducted under section 751(b) or (c), the
Commission shall determine whether revocation of an order,
or termination of a suspended investigation, would be likely
to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury
within a reasonably foreseeable time. The Commission
shall consider the likely volume, price effect, and impact of
imports of the subject merchandise on the industry if the
order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminat-
ed. The Commission shall take into account-
(A) its prior injury determinations, including the
volume, price effect, and impact of imports of the subject
merchandise on the industry before the order was issued or
the suspension agreement was accepted,
(B) whether any improvement in the state of the
industry is related to the order or the suspension agree-
ment,
(C) whether the industry is vulnerable to material
injury if the order is revoked or the suspension agreement
249 Id. art. 3.3, at 1456.
250 "Commission" refers to the International Trade Commission.
21 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 220, at 140-41.
12 The sections addressed within the implementing language refer
to changes made to 19 U.S.C. 1675.
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is terminated, and
(D) in an antidumping proceeding under section
75 1(c), the findings of the administering authority regarding
duty absorption under section 751(a)(4).
The presence or absence of any factor which the Commis-
sion is required to consider under this subsection shall not
necessarily give decisive guidance with respect to the
Commission's determination of whether material injury is
likely to continue or recur within a reasonably foreseeable
time if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation
is terminated. In making that determination, the Commis-
sion shall consider that the effects of revocation or termina-
tion may not be imminent, but may manifest themselves
only over a longer period of time.253
APPENDIX XVI: IMPLEMENTING BILL, § 220,
ABSORPTION OF DUTIES:
During any review under this subsection initiated 2 years
or 4 years after the publication of an anti-dumping duty
order under section 736(a), the administering authority, if
requested, shall determine whether antidumping duties
have been absorbed by a foreign producer or exporter ....
The administering authority shall notify the Commission of
its findings regarding such duty absorption for the Commis-
sion to consider in conducting a review under subsection (c)
[five-year reviews]. 54
APPENDIX XVII: ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT,
ARTICLE 5.8, INITIATION AND SUBSEQUENT
INVESTIGATION:
[Ain investigation shall be terminated promptly as soon as
the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify
proceeding with the case. There shall be immediate
termination in cases where the authorities determine that
23 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 221, at 144-45, 147-48.
24 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 220, at 128-29.
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the margin of dumping is de minimis .... The margin of
dumping shall be considered to be de minimis if this margin
is less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the
export pricey.5
APPENDIX XVIII: IMPLEMENTING BILL, § 213,
DE MINIMIS DUMPING MARGINS:
In making a [preliminary determination], the administering
authority shall disregard any weighted average dumping
margin that is de minimis. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, a weighted average dumping margin is de
minimis if the administering authority determines that it
is less than 2 percent ad valorem or the equivalent specific
rate for the subject merchandise. ... In making a [final
determination], the administering authority shall disregard
any weighted average dumping margin that is de minimis
as defined [above].256
" Agreement on Implementation, supra note 31, art. 5.8, at 1460.
256 H.R. 5110, supra note 137, § 213, at 101-02 (emphasis added to
ad valorem).
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